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ABORTION AND VIOLENCE
BY RUTH COLKER*
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimates that do-
mestic violence touches up to 25/o of all American families,
and that more than 33% of the women murdered in America
are killed by their husbands or boyfriends .... I
[Domestic violence] is the single largest cause of injury to
women in the United States-more common than automobile
accidents, muggings, and rapes combined.
Pregnancy does not exempt women from being abused. From
4/o to 8% of women going to prenatal clinics were abused
during pregnancy. 3
When I was taking my baby for a walk in the stroller one
morning, a woman passed me on the sidewalk wearing a t-shirt
that read, "Abortion is Murder" and displayed a large picture of
a fetus. Such t-shirts, which have become commonplace in my
community since Operation Rescue visited for several weeks in
the summer of 1992, typify the excellent job that the anti-choice
movement has done in presenting an image of pregnant women
who choose abortions as murderers. What the public, unfortu-
nately, does not always realize is that restrictions on abortion
and the harassing tactics of groups like Operation Rescue actually
increase the level of violence and coercion against pregnant
women in society in both the private and public spheres. Although
all women face violence in their lives, I will argue in this article,
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at Planned Parenthood Federation of America and Deborah Ellis at NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund for their assistance in helping me develop the materials that I cite
in this essay. I would also like to thank the faculty at the University of North Carolina
Law School for providing me with excellent feedback when I delivered this paper at a
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This article is based on chapters four and five of my recently published book: RUTH
COLKER, PREGNANT MEN: PRACTICE, THEORY, AND THE LAW (1994).
1. Antonia C. Novello & Lydia E. Soto-Torres. Women and Hidden Epidemics: HIVI
AIDS and Domestic Violence, THE FEMALE PATIENT, Jan. 1992, at 17, 22.
2. Id. at 23.
3. Antonia C Novello, Section: From the Surgeon General, United States Public Health
Sevice, 267 JAMA 3132 (1992).
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applying an anti-essentialist perspective,4 that young and poor
pregnant women who are disproportionately African American
receive the least judicial protection from such violence.
Violence against women presents a serious health threat to
women. "It is the single largest cause of injury to women in the
United States," affecting up to one-fourth of all families.5 The
former Surgeon General of the United States took a major step
forward in understanding the seriousness of this problem by
issuing the following bold statement:
Today, we face two major public health epidemics that repre-
sent particular dangers to women. One is the human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV) epidemic, and the other is domestic
violence. Although these two epidemics might seem unrelated,
they are intertwined in ways that pose serious challenges to
the health care community.... The living situations of both
groups of at-risk women are often identical-poverty, de-
creased access to primary medical care, and relationships with
men that are adversarial and demeaning.6
Moreover, she noted that pregnancy does not exempt women
from being abused; in some instances, it may even exacerbate
that abuse.7
Despite the statement of the former Surgeon General, little
progress is being made to use the health care system to detect
pregnant women who experience domestic violence. Rather than
improve access to reproductive health services, many states'
policies continue to block access or create barriers to reproductive
health services. In addition, groups like Operation Rescue succeed
in intimidating and harassing pregnant women, as well as phys-
ically blocking access to abortion clinics. These actions cause
public violence against women and put women at risk of losing
their confidentiality, thereby subjecting them to violence in the
private sphere.
Although all women-regardless of race, class, and age-are
at risk for facing violence in their lives, restrictions on abortion
and harassment at abortion clinics have a disproportionate impact
4. Gender essentialism is "the notion that a unitary, 'essential' women's experience
can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other
realities of experience." Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990).
5. Novello & Soto-Torres, supra note 1, at 22-23.
6. Id. at 17, 22.
7. Novello, supra note 3, at 3132.
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on young and poor pregnant women, because these individuals
have few options for choosing an abortion provider. As I will
discuss below, a waiting period rule, for example, is a much more
stringent restriction for a pregnant teenager who must surrep-
titiously schedule an appointment for an abortion (as well as a
trip to a judge if there is a parental consent requirement) because
of her fear of domestic violence than for an older, middle-class
pregnant woman whose decision is supported by her husband.
Similarly, harassment by anti-abortion protestors is much more
serious for that same teenager who can afford to have an abortion
only at the local clinic that is the site of abortion protests than
for the middle-class woman who can afford the privacy of her
doctor's office for her abortion. Unfortunately, the pregnant teen-
ager may try to self-induce the abortion, have an illegal abortion,8
or even commit suicide rather than try to schedule two doctors'
appointments at a clinic that may not be able to guarantee her
privacy. Nevertheless, the courts have demonstrated a systematic
disregard for the violence and coercion in the lives of young and
poor pregnant women while purporting to protect women from
domestic violence.
For the first time, the Supreme Court started to make a
connection between restrictions on abortion and private violence
against pregnant women in Planned Parenthood v. Casey with its
decision to overturn the spousal notification requirement.9 By
upholding the waiting period requirement, however, the Court
demonstrated its limited understanding of the connection be-
tween private violence against pregnant women and abortion
restrictions. As I will argue in this article, the Court understood
the problem of violence in the private sphere for pregnant,
married women who are disproportionately older, white, and
middle-class, but did not understand this problem for pregnant,
unmarried women, who are disproportionately younger, African
American, and poor. This blindness on the part of the Court, I
will argue, is a reflection of the essentialist perspective that the
Court uses when considering the reality of women's lives.
The connection between public violence against pregnant women
and abortions was not at issue in Casey. This problem arose in
8. Studies have found that illegal abortion, rather than childbirth, is the most likely
result in countries in which safe or legal abortions are not available. See Nolwandle
Nozipo Mashalaba, Commentary on the Causes and Consequences of Unwanted Pregnancy
from an African Perspective, 3 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY OBSTETRICS 15, 17 (1989).
9. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic.10 In the Bray decision,
the Court held that pregnant women and their supporters do not
have the right to use the Ku Klux Klan Act" to protect them-
selves from the public violence of anti-abortion protestors, such
as Operation Rescue, or to protect themselves from attempts by
these protestors to breach their confidentiality, thereby exposing
them to private violence. 2 Young and poor women, who are more
likely to use abortion clinics rather than doctors' offices to pro-
cure abortions, are the women most likely to be disadvantaged
by the adverse decision of the Supreme Court in Bray. The
Court's decision, once again, demonstrated its essentialist per-
spective, a perspective that leaves the most disadvantaged women
in society unprotected by the courts.
This article will discuss the phenomenon of violence and co-
ercion in the lives of pregnant women who desire to terminate
their pregnancies. It will argue that judicial protection is most
lacking for the most disadvantaged women in society because of
the courts' essentialist consideration of women's lives. In Part I,
I will discuss the anti-essentialist critique to provide the theo-
retical framework for this essay. In Part II, I will discuss the
courts' failure to protect disadvantaged women from domestic
violence, focusing on the Casey decision and the Fifth Circuit's
1992 abortion decision in Barnes v. Moore.?8 Finally, in Part III,
I will discuss the importance of the Bray decision in leaving
women unprotected from private and public violence when they
seek reproductive health services.
I. ANTI-ESSENTIALISM
A. Introduction
Although this essay proceeds from an anti-essentialist per-
spective, I do not agree with the way in which anti-essentialism
has been propounded by some theorists. In particular, I am
concerned that some versions of anti-essentialism make it impos-
sible to talk about women's treatment "as women." Because I
believe that it is critical to speak about women's treatment as
10. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
11. 42 U.S.C. S 1985(3) (1988).
12. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 756.
13. 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992).
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women in order to gain greater social recognition of the problem
of violence against pregnant women, I try to use an anti-essen-
tialist perspective in this essay that considers the diversity of
women's lives while also considering the treatment of women as
women. I will discuss the work of Angela Harris to gain insight
on what it means to write from an anti-essentialist perspective.
Angela Harris, who has done pathbreaking work on the anti-
essentialist perspective, questions our ability to speak about
women's treatment as women. She argues that when feminist
theorists, such as Catharine MacKinnon and Robin West, have
referred to women's treatment as women, often they have been
actually referring to white, heterosexual, and economically priv-
ileged women's treatment as women. 4 Harris criticizes the fol-
lowing propositions that she associates with gender essentialism
and feminist theory: "[wiomen can be talked about as 'women'....
[and w]omen's situation can be contrasted to men's."'I s
Although Harris is correct to insist that we consider the
diversity of women's lives while discussing women's treatment
in society as women, her critique overstates our inability to use
the phrase "as a woman." Harris seems to recognize the over-
statement of her critique of the use of categories because she
does not entirely dismiss the importance of categorization. She
says:
I do not mean in this article to suggest that either feminism
or legal theory should adopt the voice of Funes the Memorious,
for whom every experience is unique and no categories or
generalizations exist at all. Even a jurisprudence based on
multiple consciousness must categorize; without categorization
each individual is as isolated as Funes, and there can be no
moral responsibility or social change. My suggestion is only
that we make our categories explicitly tentative, relational,
and unstable, and that to do so is all the more important in a
discipline like law, where abstraction and "frozen" categories
are the norm. 6
Harris must acknowledge the usefulness of categories because
she uses the category "black women" in her own scholarship.
Moreover, her own use of categories would seem to be essen-
14. Harris, supra note 4, at 585-88.
15. Id. at 588 n.29 (quoting ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS
OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 165 (1988)).
16. Id. at 586.
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tialist. For example, when Harris refers to "black women," she
seems to be exclusively referring to poor black women. One could
therefore criticize Harris for holding a unitary view of black
women that is similar to the problem of theorists holding a
unitary view of women. Rather than abandon categories, it ap-
pears that the important task is to find accurate ways to employ
the use of categories. Unfortunately, Harris does not provide the
reader with much assistance in understanding when categories
are useful rather than problematic; she only suggests that we
should be "tentative" in our use of categories without explaining
what she means by "tentative."
B. Anti-Essentialism Reconsidered
To the extent that some feminists have been essentialists, I
believe that Harris has not correctly identified who those femi-
nists are. Feminist essentialists have a unitary view of women
that is based entirely on analysis of the lives of white women in
a way that is not at all inclusive of various subgroups of women.
Thus, as bell hooks points out, Betty Friedan's The Feminine
Mystique 7 was essentialist in its treatment of women.18 Friedan
discussed the special problems of middle-class housewives with
husbands and children and who did not have careers outside the
home. Her words meant little to poor women who have always
worked outside the home and who often have raised children
without the assistance of a husband. Similarly, Susan Faludi's
recent book, Backlash,19 focuses on the problems of middle-class
career women. In a sense, she updates Friedan's observations by
following how society has treated these middle-class women once
they entered careers outside the home. Lesbians, poor women,
African American women, and handicapped women, for example,
are as invisible in Faludi's presentation as in Friedan's. And, not
surprisingly, both books have sold well and received acclaim from
the mainstream press2 because they fit well into the dominant
discourse about white, middle-class women.
What these two examples show is that feminist theory is often
best accepted by the public (as measured by how many copies
17. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
18. BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 2 (1984).
19. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN (1st
ed. 1991).
20. Susan Faludi's book was on the New York Times Best Seller List and received
the 1991 National Book Critics Circle Award for nonfiction. See Gail Caldwell, Book Critics
Hanoi Smiley, Faludi, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17, 1992, at 28.
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sell) when it is essentialist in its portrayal of women. I suggest
that that is because dominant actors in society (as represented
by the book-buying public) have a unitary view of women. Fem-
inist theory that plays into that image is therefore credible, even
when that theory purports to criticize society. As feminists, then,
we need to be aware of how our critique of society may have
been molded by what the dominant groups in society want to
hear. Essentialist accounts of women will not be challenged by
those dominant groups even though they may be challenged by
other feminists.
I suggest that in order to discuss the category "woman" in a
meaningful way we need to make three distinctions. First, we
must distinguish between how society acts upon a category that
it perceives to be "woman" and how women themselves respond
to those actions. Law and society often are essentialist, by which
I mean that they have a narrow, unitary view of women in mind
when they create policies and programs. Women, in fact, are
quite diverse. Law and society's failure to see that diversity
creates different kinds of problems for different women, depend-
ing upon how closely they fit law and society's false image of
women. Thus, we should ask ourselves the following crucial
question in constructing feminist theory: What view of women
does law and society have in mind when it creates various policies
and programs? If that view is static and unitary then it is an
essentialist view and should be described as such. The fact that
feminists may identify society's view of women as essentialist
does not make feminist theory itself essentialist. In addition,
identifying society's essentialist view of women may help us to
understand how policies affect different women in different ways.
Second, we need to distinguish between biological arguments
and essentialism. Feminist theorists may rely on women's biolog-
ical differences from men to explain some aspects of women's
subordination in society without being essentialists. Their biolog-
ical arguments will not be essentialist so long as they refer to
the biological variation among women as well as to the different
ways that society treats the same biological traits within women.
Some theorists, such as Catharine MacKinnon, 21 suggest that one
is essentialist only if one relies on biological arguments in con-
structing feminist theory. Such a view cannot be correct within
feminist theory because it prevents us from discussing the bio-
21. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What is a White
Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
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logical differences between women and men. By definition, women
and men do differ biologically-that difference is the basis upon
which society assigns people to the categories "male" and "fe-
male." By insisting that feminists entirely ignore such differences,
feminists are being as essentialist as their critics. In other words,
by denying categorically that the differences between men and
women are relevant to feminist theory (and society), one is being
rigid, unitary, and universal-the purported evils of essentialism.
Rather than avoiding biological arguments entirely, the challenge
for feminists is to sort out innate biological differences between
men and women that have some bearing on women's position in
society and those purported differences that have been exagger-
ated by society; moreover, we should examine differences among
women in terms of their biology as well as differences among
women in terms of how society treats their biology.2
Finally, when we talk about a policy's impact on "women," we
do not have to feel compelled to describe a unitary effect of that
policy on women. Some women may experience a heightened
effect of the policy while other women may experience an op-
posing effect. All of these women are acted upon by society but
they can be acted upon in quite different ways. We are essen-
tialist when we assume a priori that certain subgroups such as
African American women or lesbians will experience a heightened
version of white, heterosexual women's experience.
Rather than examining an author's use of biological arguments
to determine whether she is an essentialist, I would prefer to
look at what stories the author tells. Feminists must read vora-
ciously about the lives of as many women as possible, because
none of us can know all women through our daily experiences.
And because we are more likely to know women who are like
us, it is especially important that we read about women who are
quite different from ourselves in race, class, physical ability,
sexual orientation, etc. Only by being constantly vigilant and
curious can we think about and talk about all women as we try
to understand the nature of women's subordination in society.
When authors are not inclusive, we should be quick to criticize.
But when an author, such as Catharine MacKinnon, consistently
tells stories about many different kinds of women in her schol-
22. See generally Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men, COLUM. J. GENDER & L. (1993) (discussing
biological arguments in order to show that society treats women differently because of
their ability to become pregnant, and how biology perpetuates women's subordination in
society).
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arship, we should read those stories and try to learn from them.
Of course, we might disagree with her interpretation of her
stories. Storytelling, by itself, is not sufficient. We need to reflect
closely on the stories that are told. Why are those particular
stories told rather than others? Are other interpretations of
those stories available? Do counternarratives also exist?
In Parts II and III, I will examine the stories that the Supreme
Court and the Fifth Circuit are willing to consider to determine
the appropriate role of the courts in preventing violence in the
lives of pregnant women. I will suggest that they are more
willing to protect white, middle-class pregnant women than poor,
young pregnant women from violence, thereby being attentive
to the concerns of only some women in society.
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN DURING PREGNANCY
A. The Problem
Although violence against women is dangerous to both a woman
and her fetus during pregnancy, pregnant women face substantial
domestic violence in their lives. In a recent article in the Journal
of the American Medical Association, Dr. Judith McFarlane and
her colleagues found that seventeen percent of women reported
abuse during pregnancy. The researchers also found that abused
women were twice as likely as non-abused women to postpone
prenatal care until the third trimester of pregnancy. 4 The authors
explained this phenomenon by noting that the abused women had
learned "forced avoidance" from health care.2 5
McFarlane's statistics show rates of abuse during pregnancy
that are about twice as high as those recorded in some other
studies. 26 The difference in results appears attributable to her
research methodology. Rather than being asked about abuse on
a standard medical history intake form, the women in this study
were asked about abuse directly by their health care providers.2
In a related study, about eight percent of women reported abuse
when surveyed through a standard medical history form, whereas
23. Judith McFarlane et al., Assessing for Abuse During Pregnancy, 267 JAMA 3176,
3176 (1992).
24. Id. at 3177.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 3177-78.
27. Id. at 3178.
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twenty-nine percent of these same women reported abuse when
asked directly by a health care provider.28 McFarlane's research
strategy therefore seems to produce more reliable results than
strategies used in previous studies.
McFarlane's findings replicate the findings of a 1985 study by
the National Family Violence Survey. According to the 1985
study:
154 out of every 1000 pregnant women were assaulted by their
mates during the first four months of pregnancy, and 170 per
1000 women were assaulted during the fifth through the ninth
months. Approximately 370/0 of obstetric patients, across class,
race, and educational lines, are physically abused while preg-
nant. Such assaults can result in placental separation, antepar-
tum hemorrhage, fetal fractures, rupture of the uterus, liver,
or spleen, and preterm labor.P
Moreover, the 1985 study found that pregnant women's risk of
abusive violence was 60.6% greater than that of nonpregnant
women,3 although that difference appears to be attributable to
age rather than pregnancy.3' Finally, the Second National Family
Violence Survey found that the nature of abuse may change
during pregnancy, with pregnant women suffering increased blows
to the abdomen.32
Although studies have found that health care providers may
have an inclination to perceive that women most at risk of abuse
during pregnancy are African American,3  McFarlane's study
reached the opposite conclusion. White women were found to be
most at risk, followed by Hispanic women, and then followed by
African American women.4 These findings confirm previous find-
28. Id.
29. Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Violence Against
Women: Relevance for Medical Practitioners, 267 JAMA 3184, 3186-87 (1992) (citing Richard
J. Gelles, Violence and Pregnancy: Are Pregnant Women at Greater Risk of Abuse?, 50 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 841 (1988)).
30. Eli H. Newberger et al., Abuse of Pregnant Women and Adverse Birth Outcome:
Current Knowledge and Implications for Practice, 267 JAMA 2370, 2370 (1992) (citing
Gelles, supra note 29, at 844).
31. Id. (citing Gelles, supra note 29) (but noting that increased risk for pregnant
women is probably attributable to age "because women under 25 years of age were more
likely both to be pregnant and to be abused by husbands and partners").
32. See Gelles, supra note 29, at 846 (1988).
33. See, e.g., Nancy Kathleen Sugg, Primary Care Physicians' Response to Domestic
Violence: Opening Pandora's Box, 267 JAMA 3157, 3158-60 (1992).
34. McFarlane, supra note 23, at 3177.
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ings that reported physical abuse was three and one-half times
higher among white than Hispanic or black women.35
Dr. Anne Flitcraft criticizes McFarlane's conclusions concerning
race because she claims that McFarlane is insufficiently attentive
to "severity of physical abuse." 36 She points out that homicide
data show that African American women are at greater risk of
being killed by their partners3 7 She suggests that it is important
to analyze potential male abusers' threats with and access to a
weapon because of the greater likelihood that such situations
may result in death3s Flitcraft writes of McFarlane's data: "An
alternative interpretation may be that severity of abuse differs
little across ethnic groups and that threats with and access to a
weapon should be ranked in a category with a high probability
of significant injury, predictive of severe abuse."39 The important
point to gather from the McFarlane and Flitcraft studies is that
all women are at risk of domestic abuse, but that the most
common form of abuse may differ depending upon the woman's
race and ethnicity. White women may suffer disproportionate
amounts of domestic abuse, whereas African American women
may face the disproportionate likelihood of paying the ultimate
price of death during an episode of domestic violence. Both
problems-frequency and severity-deserve our serious atten-
tion. Clearly, health care providers who believe that their white,
middle-class patients are immune from domestic violence are
sadly mistaken.
Another important aspect of McFarlane's findings is that women
who delay obtaining prenatal care until the third trimester are
more likely to face domestic violence than those who seek such
care earlier.4 Barriers to reproductive health services, including
abortion-related restrictions such as gag rules, waiting period
requirements, and other abortion restrictions, as well as Medicaid
restrictions on health care services, further contribute to this
problem of abused women who fail to seek timely prenatal care.
In the name of "life," the "pro-life" movement has unfortunately
harmed the lives of pregnant women and their fetuses. We have
always known that failure to seek prenatal care correlates with
35. Id. (citation omitted).
36. Anne H. Flitcraft, Violence, Values and Gender, 267 JAMA 3194, 3194 (1992).
37. Id. (citing James A: Mercy & Linda E. Saltzman, Fatal Violence Among Spouses
in the United States, 1976-85, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 595 (1989)).
38, Id. at 3194-95.
39. Id. at 3195.
40. See McFarlane, supra note 23, at 3177.
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harm to the fetus;41 we now know that it correlates with harm
to the pregnant woman as well.
Our failure to detect and eliminate domestic abuse harms both
pregnant women and their fetuses. In calling for a renewed effort
by gynecologists to detect abuse of pregnant women, the Presi-
dent of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG) has stated that obstetricians and gynecologists have "a
double reason for addressing the problem. The first is to protect
our patients themselves. The second is to protect the unborn
children during pregnancy, because, as brutal as it seems, recent
studies show that pregnancy itself may incite violence by the
husband or partner."42
Reproductive health services could make an important contri-
bution to the detection of domestic violence if prenatal care were
more universally available and widely used. The AGOG has begun
to recognize the importance of gynecologists in determining the
existence of domestic violence in women's lives. They recently
sent their members information about battered women to help
them recognize domestic abuse problems. 43 This information points
out that the most important attribute for physicians to use in
detecting domestic violence is sensitivity. When asked directly,
most women will answer honestly so long as the batterer is not
present.44 When doctors talk with women about suspected or
even admitted incidents of violence, sensitivity to their needs at
that moment and the ability to provide concrete assistance are
critical.46 Barriers to reproductive health care service make it
difficult for those sensitive discussions to occur and help cause
domestic violence to remain undetected.
B. The Courts' Responses
1. The Casey Decision
Despite the problem of abuse to women during pregnancy, the
Supreme Court has done little to protect the most disadvantaged
41. See Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health
Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324, 338-40.
42. Teri Randall, ACOG Renews Domestic Violence Campaign, Calls for Changes in
Medical School Curricula, 267 JAMA 3131, 3131 (1992).
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See McFarlane, supra note 23, at 3178.
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women from such abuse. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,6 the
United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
a Pennsylvania statute which, among other things, required that
pregnant women notify their husbands of their desire to obtain
an abortion and make two doctor visits separated by at least
twenty-four hours in order to procure an abortion.4 7 The Court
upheld the waiting period requirement but overturned the spou-
sal notification requirement because of a purported sensitivity to
the problems of domestic violence. In assessing the constitution-
ality of these requirements, the Court applied an "undue burden"
standard under which it tried to examine the impact of these
provisions from the perspective of the women most affected by
them-asking whether the regulations posed a "substantial ob-
stacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion."48 The Supreme
Court considered the findings of fact of the district court to
determine whether an undue burden existed with respect to each
of the requirements imposed by the Pennsylvania statute. The
district court had entered extensive findings documenting the
46. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
47. The Pennsylvania statute contains the following requirements:
S 3209. Spousal Notice.
(a) Spousal notice required.-In order to further the Commonwealth's
interest in promoting the integrity of the marital relationship and to protect
a spouse's interests in having children within marriage and in protecting the
prenatal life of that spouse's child, no physician shall perform an abortion
on a married woman, except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), unless he
or she has received a signed statement, which need not be notarized, from
the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed, that she has notified
her spouse that she is about to undergo an abortion. The statement shall
bear a notice that any false statement made therein is punishable by law.
(b) Exceptions.-The statement certifying that the notice required by
subsection (a) has been given need not be furnished where the woman
provides the physician a signed statement certifying at least one of the
following:
(1) Her spouse is not the father of the child.
(2) Her spouse, after diligent effort, could not be located.
(3) The pregnancy is a result of spousal sexual assault as described
in section 3128 (relating to spousal sexual assault), which has been
reported to a law enforcement agency having the requisite jurisdiction.
(4) The woman has reason to believe that the furnishing of notice
to her spouse is likely to result in the infliction of bodily injury upon
her by her spouse or by another individual.
Such statement need not be notarized, but shall bear a notice that any false
statements made therein are punishable by law.
(c) Medical 6mergency.-The requirements of subsection (a) shall not apply
in case of a medical emergency.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 3209 (Supp. 1993).
48. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821.
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extent to which the spousal notification requirement might en-
danger the psychological and physical well-being of women and
their children.
The defendants tried to counter that evidence by pointing out
that the statute imposed almost no burden at all for the vast
majority of women seeking abortions, because only about twenty
percent of the women who seek abortions are married and about
ninety-five percent of those women voluntarily notify their hus-
bands of their intention to procure an abortion.49 Thus, the
defendants argued that only about one percent of the women
seeking abortions would be affected by the statute's notice re-
quirements.50 They suggested that the impact on "women" should
be measured by the impact on the vast majority of women. 1
The Supreme Court, however, did not accept the defendants'
attempt to define women by majoritarian standards. Instead, the
Court made the bold statement: "The analysis does not end with
the one percent of women upon whom the statute operates; it
begins there. Legislation is measured for consistency with the
Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it affects."52
The Court's analysis began with the fact that the spousal notice
requirement was intended to affect married women who did not
qualify for one of the statutes' exceptions and who did not wish
to notify their husbands of their intention to procure an abortion.
Looking at the lives of those women, the Court concluded that
the statute operated as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice
to undergo an abortion. The Supreme Court concluded that "the
spousal notification requirement is ... likely to prevent a signif-
icant number of women from obtaining an abortion. It does not
merely make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to
obtain; for many women, it will impose a substantial obstacle."'
At first glance, the Court's application of its undue burden
standard seemed quite sensitive to the lives of disadvantaged
women. It focused its inquiry on the women whose conduct was
affected by the statute and recognized that these women faced
substantial risk of injury. Unfortunately, even as the Court made
those broad pronouncements, it also narrowly applied them to
the case at hand. The Court's application of those standards to
49. Id. at 2829.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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the waiting period requirement left unprotected the most disad-
vantaged women-unmarried poor women who face domestic
violence.
The Court did not overturn the waiting period requirement
although the district court had made numerous findings concern-
ing the impact that that requirement would have on young, poor
women who are at risk of domestic violence as well as harassment
by anti-abortion protestors. The trial court had found:
Two trips to the abortion provider would subject many
women to the harassment and hostility of anti-abortion protes-
tors ....
... For the majority of women in Pennsylvania, delays will
range from 48 hours to two weeks.
... Women who live in any of ... 62 counties must travel
for at least one hour, and sometimes longer than three hours,
to obtain an abortion from the nearest provider.
The ... waiting period will be particularly burdensome to
those women who have the least financial resources, such as
the poor and the young, those women that travel long dis-
tances, such as women living in rural areas, and those women
that have difficulty explaining their whereabouts, such as bat-
tered women, school age women, and working women without
sick leave.
In some cases, the delays caused by the 24-hour waiting
period will push patients into the second trimester of their
pregnancy substantially increasing the cost of the procedure
itself and making the procedure more dangerous medically.
A delay of 24 hours will have a negative impact on both the
physical and psychological health of some patients, as well as
increase the risk of complications.54
Although these findings appear to parallel the findings regard-
ing spousal notification, the Supreme Court concluded that the
waiting period might be "particularly burdensome" to a particular
group of women yet not be a substantial obstacle even as to the
women in that group. Using the semantic distinction between a
particular burden and a substantial obstacle, the Court upheld
the waiting period requirement but invalidated the spousal no-
tification requirement.
54. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1351-52 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (citations
omitted).
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One is therefore left wondering why the .waiting period re-
quirement was less problematic than the spousal notification
requirement. The Supreme Court found that the spousal notice
requirement affected women who would not voluntarily choose
to notify their husbands of their desire to have an abortion.
These are likely to be women who fear domestic violence. Simi-
larly, who are the women who would not voluntarily choose to
wait twenty-four hours after visiting an abortion provider to
have an abortion? Married, middle-class women would typically
visit a doctor, receive a pregnancy test, and schedule an abortion
at a later time. Unmarried poor women, who feared domestic
violence if their partner or family knew of their pregnancy,
however, would not voluntarily wait twenty-four hours. Fearful
that they could not afford to surreptitiously visit an abortion
clinic twice, they would want to have the abortion at the same
time as they obtained the positive pregnancy test. The Court,
however, could not see that their reasons for failing to comply
voluntarily with the statute's waiting period requirement were
as compelling as those of the women who did not voluntarily
want to notify their spouse.
I suggest that it was the Court's essentialism that prevented
it from seeing the equivalent burdens on these two groups of
women. The Court could imagine and sympathize with the bur-
dens on middle-class married women imposed by the spousal
notification requirement but could not imagine and sympathize
with the burdens on young, poor women who are disproportion-
ately African American. The difference in the Court's sympathies,
I would suggest, was governed by the class and race of the
groups that would be most affected by the requirements. The
notification requirement only applied to married women. Because
middle-class women are more likely to marry than poor women,55
the spousal notification requirement would arguably affect mid-
dle-class women more than poor women. By contrast, the waiting
period requirement would most strongly impact poor women who
were already paying for their abortions with rolls of nickels and
dimes and who could not afford the extra costs associated with
the waiting period requirement.
The Court openly used a class-based analysis when it con-
trasted the two requirements. After affirming the waiting period
requirement, although acknowledging that it might increase the
55. E. Douglass Williams & Richard H. Sander, The Prospects for "Putting America
to Work" in the Inner City, 81 GEo. L.J. 2003, 2005 (1993).
ABORTION AND VIOLENCE
costs of the procedure for some women, the Court stated that
the spousal notification requirement was invalid, because "it does
not merely make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to
obtain .... "5 The significant word in the above quotation is
"merely." Why is an obstacle that prevents a woman from ob-
taining an abortion "merely" an inconvenience rather than a
substantial obstacle? For a woman who cannot afford an abortion
because of the increased costs of the waiting period requirement,
the restriction is as much of an obstacle as for the woman who
cannot procure an abortion because of her inability to obtain
spousal notification. It is "merely" an inconvenience rather than
a substantial obstacle to a court that is determinedly uninterested
in considering class-based impacts of legal requirements. Thus,
despite the Court's assertion that it would examine the burdens
of the statute from the perspective of the women most impacted
by them, some women's burdens appear not to count. They are
a mere inconvenience rather than a substantial obstacle.
Not only did the Court openly state that it was not interested
in protecting poor women, its ruling will also impact African
American women disproportionately. Although it is true that
poor people are less likely to marry than middle-class people, it
is also true that race is a very important variable in understand-
ing those marriage patterns. "Low-income white fathers ... [are]
two and one-half times more likely to marry than low-income"
African American fathers whose girlfriends bear children out of
wedlock.5 7 Similarly, upper-income white fathers are twice as
likely to marry as upper-income African American fathers whose
girlfriends bear children out of wedlock.5 Class, however, is an
important countervailing variable. Employed African American
men whose girlfriends bear children out of wedlock, for example,
are ninety-three percent more likely to marry than unemployed
black men. 9
The Court's holding can be described in two ways from an
anti-essentialist perspective. One could say that the Court was
essentialist in that it was blind to the impact on young, poor
women who are disproportionately African American. Alterna-
tively, one could say that the Court was quite aware of the
56. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829.
57. Patrick T. Reardon, Reasons Sought for Dip in Rate of Black Marriages, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 17, 1991, at C1.
58. Id. at C1.
59. Id. at C7.
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impact of its decision on the lives of young, poor women but it
did not choose to protect them from domestic violence. Under
the second explanation, the Court is not actually essentialist;
instead, it is simply uncaring or vindictive. The application of an
anti-essentialist perspective, however, allows us to see the un-
caring or vindictive attitude of the Court toward young, poor
women. In this article, I have generally used the first explanation
to describe the Court's action because it is a "gentler" description;
however, I can empathize with the reader who finds the second
explanation to be more accurate. The important point for the
purposes of this article is that the Court's decision left poor
women and African American women unprotected from domestic
violence.
2. Post-Casey: Mississippi
It would appear that the undue burden standard is a fact-
intensive standard, not lending itself easily to importation from
one state to another. In practice, however, courts are likely to
overlook the fact-intensive nature of the undue burden standard.
Rather than accept the possibility that a particular requirement
is valid in one state but invalid in another, courts are likely to
look for broad rules such as "waiting period requirements are
valid and spousal notification requirements are invalid." These
broad rules are likely to perpetuate the insensitivity of the Casey
decision. The first indication of the courts' search for firm rules
that are not fact-intensive occurred in the 1992 Fifth Circuit
decision in the Mississippi case Barnes v. Moore.60
The statute challenged in Barnes was similar to the one chal-
lenged in Casey.6' For example, like the Pennsylvania statute, it
contained a twenty-four hour waiting period requirement.6 2
Whereas Pennsylvania is a relatively prosperous industrial state,
Mississippi is the poorest state in the United States.6 If the
Fifth Circuit had been truly willing to explore the impact of the
waiting period requirement on the women in Mississippi most
affected by it, the court should have concluded that that burden
constituted a substantial obstacle despite the Supreme Court's
ruling in Casey.
60. 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.) (vacating the district court's preliminary injunction), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992).
61. MIss. CODE ANN. S 41-41-31 (1972).
62. Id.
63. Census Findings: South ?entral Region, WASH. PosT, July 22, 1992, at A17.
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As discussed below, the waiting period requirement in Missis-
sippi increases the health risk of an abortion, raises its costs,
and imposes transportation, housing, and child care difficulties
on women 4 Such burdens make it nearly impossible for many
women to effectuate their reproductive choices. These burdens
are most directly imposed on women who are least represented
in the political process and most in need of improved access to
health care. I will focus on the effects on poor women and women
who are in abusive relationships because these waiting period
requirements will increase the level of violence in their lives.
Mississippi is the poorest state in the United States. Twenty-
five percent of the persons in the state live below the poverty
line-more than twice the national average and the highest
percentage in the United States.65 The median household income
in Mississippi is the lowest in the United States.66 Welfare pay-
ments are also very low in Mississippi. For example, the maxi-
mum monthly Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefit
for a family of three in 1989 was $120 per month-the second
lowest in the United States.67
Among the poor of Mississippi, women-particularly young
women and African American women-are the poorest. Overall,
twenty-one and one-half percent of the family households in the
state are headed by females;6 these households are dispropor-
tionately poor. In fiscal year 1991, for example, females consti-
tuted nearly seventy-five percent of all of the people in the state
on Medicaid. 9 In addition, children under the age of twenty
constitute fifty-five percent of the Medicaid recipients. 70 Seventy-
one percent of Medicaid recipients are African American.71 Un-
fortunately, extreme poverty, combined with a shortage of af-
fordable and accessible health care providers, places Mississippi
64. See infra notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
65. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MEDIAN INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS AND PERCENT OF PERSONS
IN POVERTY BY STATE (1988-90).
66. Mississippi's median household income is $20,414. The next lowest is Alabama's,
at $22,610. Id.
67. See AILEEN WHITFALL, THE HEALTH OF AMERICA'S SOUTHERN CHILDREN 34 tbl. 3.1
(1989).
68. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: MISSISSIPPI
60 tbl. 6 (1990).
69. See MISSISSIPPI MEDICAID MANAGEMENT INFO. SYS., STATISTICAL REPORT ON MEDICAL
CARE: ELIGIBLES, RECIPIENTS, PAYMENTS, AND SERVICES S D(2) (1991).
70. See id.
71. See id.
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at or near the bottom of all states in accessibility of both abortion
services72 and prenatal care.7 3
The mandatory delay in the Mississippi abortion statute in-
creases both the medical risk and the cost of abortions. Because
of work, school, or family responsibilities, many poor women can
go to a clinic only on Saturdays; the waiting period requirement,
therefore, will delay their abortions by at least one week.7 4 Rates
of morbidity increase by thirty percent with each week of delay
beyond the eighth week of pregnancy.75
Delays of one week can raise the cost of an abortion by fifty
to two hundred dollars, 6 which can be prohibitive for a poor
woman. As established in the district court in Barnes, many
women pay for their abortions in rolls of dimes, nickels, and
pennies.77 Poor women already unduly delay their abortions as
they scrape together the money to pay for them.78 The additional
72. Medicaid does not cover the cost of an abortion for a poor woman. Women in
Mississippi carry to term quite frequently and have few abortions. Mississippi ranks 49th
in its abortion occurrence rate. ABORTION SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, EACH STATE
& METROPOLITAN AREA, 1984-1985, at 17 tbl. 3 (Stanley K. Henshaw and Jennifer Van
Vort eds., 1988). Mississippi ranks 45th in the number of adolescents who obtain abortions.
ALAN GUTTENMACHER INSTITUTE, SELECTED FACTS ABOUT TEENAGE PREGNANCY: MISSISSIPPI
1989, at 12 (1991).
73. In 1987 Mississippi had 12.5 doctors per 10,000 people, the second lowest ratio in
the United States. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH UNITED
STATES: 1990, at 161 tbl. 87 (1991). Mississippi ranked 36th in the United States for its
lack of timely provision of prenatal care from 1984-86. 1 SUSHEELA SINGH ET AL., PRENATAL
CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATE AND COUNTY INVENTORY 20 tbl. 2.2 (1989). Mississippi
has the dubious distinction of having the highest percentage of low birthweight babies;
8.7% of all babies in Mississippi were born at low birthweights in 1986. MELBA CARR ET
AL., REPORT ON MINORITY HEALTH IN MISSISSIPPI 19 (1990). "Mississippi's 1989 infant
mortality rate was 11.6 infant deaths per 1,000 live births. The national rate for infant
mortality was 9.7." Id.
74. Declaration of Joseph Mitchell, M.D., at 1 34 (May 31, 1991), Barnes v. Moore, No.
J91-0245(W) (S.D. Miss.), vacated, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656
(1992) [hereinafter Mitchell Decl.].
75. Declaration of Stanley K. Henshaw, Ph.D., at 1 17 (May 30, 1991). Barnes. No. J91-
0245(W) [hereinafter Henshaw Decl.].
76. At Mississippi Women's Medical Center, the cost of an abortion increases $205
between the 11th and 12th week of pregnancy, an additional $50 at week 15, and an
additional $100 beyond week 16. Declaration of Lisa Brown at 1 5 (May 31, 1991), Barnes,
No. J91-0245(W) [hereinafter Brown Decl.].
77. Brown Decl., supra note 76, at 1 6.
78. In one study, 60% of women having abortions after 15 weeks attributed the delay
to their need for "time to raise money" for the abortion. Aida Torres & Jacqueline
Darroch Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169, 174 (1988).
See also Declaration of Joseph Booker, Jr., M.D., at 117-8 (May 31, 1991), Barnes, No. J91-
0245(W); Brown Decl., supra note 76, at 1 6; Declaration of J. Edward Hill, M.D., at 11
9, 11, 14 (June 4, 1991), Barnes, No. J91-0245(W) [hereinafter Hill Decl.]; Declaration of
Karen Jenkins at 1 16-19 (May 31, 1991), Barnes, No. J91-0245(W) [hereinafter Jenkins
Decl.]; Mitchell Decl., supra note 74, at 1 38; Declaration of Thomas Walter Tucker, II,
M.D., at 1 7-10 (May 31, 1991), Barnes, No. J91-0245(W).
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complication and delay resulting from the statute, therefore, hits
poor women particularly hard because the increase in cost per
week is steeper in the second trimester than in the first trimes-
ter.
In addition, Mississippi's serious transportation problems ex-
acerbate the burdens of the mandatory delay in three ways.
First, the difficulty of procuring transportation adds to the delay.
This, in turn, increases the cost of the abortion. Finally, making
two trips instead of one to the abortion provider, at a minimum,
doubles the cost of transportation itself.
Two of the three abortion providers in the state are located
in Jackson. Of the eighty-two counties in Mississippi, seventy-
nine have no known abortion providers, although nearly three
thousand women from these counties obtained abortions in 1989.79
Nearly half of all abortion patients travel one hundred miles or
more for abortion-related services. For example, Lisa Brown
stated in her Declaration in Barnes: "The average patient travels
approximately 2 hours to obtain an abortion at the Clinic, but
some travel much longer to arrive at the Clinic. Over 650 of our
patients in 1990 traveled over 100 miles total to obtain abortion
services."8o
Poor women living in remote rural areas of the state must
often travel two hundred miles to obtain an abortion in Jackson.
Families living in poverty are likely to be female-headed house-
holds in remote rural areas of the state.81 Six of the seven
Mississippi counties in which more than thirty percent of the
families live below the poverty line are located in the northwest
region of the state.82
Poor women seeking abortions are dependent upon an inade-
quate public transportation system. For example, at trial, Dr.
Morrison testified:
One case recently had to come from Clarksdale, and you might
think that's not a far journey, but if you have to take the
Trailways bus you have to go to Memphis. Then you have-
to catch the bus you have to leave at 4:00 o'clock in the
morning, get the bus to Memphis, then come to Jackson, get
here at 12:00. Then that woman would have to go back the
same route, get in at midnight, turn around and come back
79. Henshaw Decl., supra note 75, at 8.
80. Brown Decl., supra note 76, at 1 7.
81. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
82. See GINA STONE, HANDBOOK OF SELECTED DATA FOR Mississippi 71 (1989).
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the next morning. And I think that puts a burden on that
woman and on me as a physician that would be ridiculous and
onerous and certainly is true of no other medical condition.p
Virtually no women on welfare own an automobile and exceed-
ingly few have access to a reliable oneP4 Travel expenses to a
clinic range from approximately thirty-five to fifty dollars; for a
woman who has to make two trips, these expenses will be seventy
to one hundred dollars. 85
The waiting period requirement will often necessitate an over-
night stay in Jackson. Poor women, however, will find it very
burdensome to bear the extra expenses of an overnight stay,81
along with the expenses of an unpaid absence from work and the
increased child care costs attendant to an absence from their
home. Some women will have no alternative but to spend the
night on the street in order to comply with the waiting period
requirement.87
These burdens will be further exacerbated for poor women
who face domestic violence because they cannot afford the risk
of their partner discovering that they have visited an abortion
clinic. One visit to the doctor's office is already a dangerous task
for them; two trips will often be extremely dangerous or impos-
sible. Unfortunately, many pregnant women live in abusive re-
lationships in which they cannot inform their partner of their
pregnancy and of their desire to obtain an abortion. Studies
indicate that there is a correlation between pregnancy and bat-
tering; for example, some men beat their wives only when they
know that their wives are pregnant.88 For such women, even one
83. Trial Transcript at 108, Barnes v. Moore (No. J91-0245(W)). See also Trial Transcript
at 44, Barnes (No. J91-0245(W)).
84. Only 3.6% of the families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children in
Mississippi in 1989 owned a car. See U.S. DEP!T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF AFDC RECIPIENTS, FY 1989, at 71
tbl. 47 (1989). See also Hill Decl., supra note 78. at 1 12; Jenkins Decl., supra note 78, at
19.
85. Declaration of Rims Barber at 6 (May 29, 1991), Barnes, No. J91-0245(W).
86. The cost of lodging near the various clinics ranges from $22.50 to $43.00 per night.
Id. at 8-9.
87. For example, Dr. Hill stated in his Declaration:
If my patients are required to stay overnight in Jackson they will most
likely sleep in the car, if they can get the other person [who gave them the
ride] to stay overnight, or outside the clinic in the street. None of my
patients have ever stayed in a hotel that I know of, and I don't believe they
could afford to do so.
Hill Decl., supra note 78, at 1 14.
88. See MILDRED D. PAGELOW, FAMILY VIOLENCE 314-15 (1984).
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unexplained visit to a doctor may be quite dangerous. For ex-
ample, Lisa Brown stated in her Declaration in the Barnes case:
"I fear for the health of battered women who need abortions.
Battered women seeking abortions already have to reschedule
several times because it is difficult for them to get away from
their batterers. The Act would only further thwart their attempts
to obtain high quality health care." 89 Requiring such women to
visit a doctor twice, and possibly to incur an overnight stay away
from home, may make the "choice" of an abortion impossible.
Although these women's lives or health may be threatened if
their partners discover that they are seeking an abortion, the
medical emergency exception in the Mississippi statute does not
apply to their situation.9
It is impossible to overstate the importance of confidentiality
to women who face domestic abuse. Although a spousal notifi-
cation requirement is one way that women can lose their confi-
dentiality, waiting period rules also pose a serious risk of loss of
confidentiality for many women. Planned Parenthood, for exam-
ple, goes to enormous lengths to protect women's confidentiality
when they go to one office visit, not necessarily for an abortion.
The organization sends letters to women in "code" in unmarked
envelopes and does not leave telephone messages at women's
homes. Despite these efforts, a woman faces domestic violence
when her male partner calls the post office to find out the source
of a postal frank, learns of an unidentified caller's telephone
number through special telephone features, or is informed by an
anti-choice advocate that his partner's car was seen in an abortion
clinic parking lot.91 Each time a woman must visit an abortion
clinic office she takes a serious risk of loss of confidentiality.
Many women will be forced to choose illegal abortions because
they will not be able to afford either the increased costs or the
risks caused by the waiting period requirement. While few abor-
tion-related deaths presently occur, the higher incidence of illegal
abortions can be expected to increase abortion-related mortal-
89. Brown Decl., supra note 76, at 10.
90. See, e.g., Mitchell Decl., supra note 74, at 11 11-22. The Mississippi statute defines
a medical emergency as a "condition which, on the basis of the physician's best clinical
judgment, so complicates a pregnancy as to necessitate an immediate abortion to avert
the death of the mother or for which a twenty-four hour delay will create grave peril of
immediate and irreversible loss of major bodily function." MIss. CODE ANN. S 41-41-31
(1972).
91. These examples are drawn from discussions with my friends who work for Planned
Parenthood or local abortion clinics.
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ity - particularly for the poor and disadvantaged. Mishandled
criminal abortions were the principal cause of maternal deaths
in the 1960s, when most abortions were performed illegally.9 2
Women of color, who are disproportionately poor, suffered the
most from the lack of safe, legal abortions; they accounted for
sixty-four percent of the deaths associated with illegal abortions
in this country in .19723 The mortality rates for African American
women were nine times higher than for white women.9 4 We can
expect the statute to cause poor women, who are disproportion-
ately African American, to find it difficult to choose a lawful
abortion and to face increased rates of death from mishandled
illegal abortions.
The waiting period requirement will act coercively in the lives
of poor women by placing them at increased risk of losing their
confidentiality and increasing the health risks of abortion proce-
dures. Loss of confidentiality will increase the risk of domestic
violence. Women will also be less likely to seek reproductive
health services, which in turn, will place them at higher risk for
domestic violence that will go undetected.
III. PUBLIC VIOLENCE AGAINST PREGNANT WOMEN
A. The Problem
Abortion-related violence is not limited to domestic violence.
Some women seeking abortions face public violence and harass-
ment through the actions of organizations such as Operation
Rescue. These groups physically block access to abortion clinics,
expose women to violence and harassment as they seek access
to abortion providers, and attempt to breach the confidentiality
of women seeking abortions, thereby exposing them to violence
and harassment elsewhere. Because poor and young women are
more likely to use abortion clinics, which offer the lowest cost
abortion services, and middle-class, older women are more likely
to use private abortion providers who typically escape the wrath
92. Kenneth R. Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the United States, in ABORTION
AND THE LAW 53 (Smith ed. 1967).
93. Willard Cates, Jr., & Roger Rochat, Illegal Abortions in the United States: 1972-
1974, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 86, 87 (1976).
94. Edwin M. Gold et al., Therapeutic Abortions in New York: A 20 Year Review, 55
AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 964-65 (1965).
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of Operation Rescue,95 this public violence disproportionately
impacts poor and young women. The most disadvantaged women
in society therefore need protection from the harassment of
groups like Operation Rescue.
The Ku Klux Klan Act9 was enacted in 1871 to provide federal
assistance to state and local authorities to assure that private
mobs do not destroy the ability of vulnerable groups to enjoy an
equal right to live under the rule of law. In the Bray case, the
Supreme Court decided that the Ku Klux Klan Act is inapplicable
to protect pregnant women from anti-abortion protestors.9 7 The
Ku Klux Klan Act prohibits conspiracies
for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, or for
the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted author-
ities ... from giving or securing to all persons ... the equal
protection of the laws.9 8
When women use the statute successfully, it enables them to
obtain injunctions against Operation Rescue, thereby keeping
clinics open and minimizing the impact of Operation Rescue's
harassing and violent tacticsY9
1. Loss of Confidentiality
Operation Rescue organizes its tactics so as to make women
fear a loss of confidentiality. Illustrations of this and other tactics
come from a brief filed in the Supreme Court by the National
Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL). 100 The briefs appendix
contains dozens of letters from women active in the pro-choice
movement. Excerpts from these letters describe the effect that
such loss of confidentiality may have on women:
As an escort I have observed anti-abortion picketers photo-
graphing all people who enter clinics. I know of one particular
95. These generalizations are made on the basis of my own experience in Louisiana
defending abortion clinics from Operation Rescue.
96. 42 U.S.C. S 1985 (1988).
97. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
98. 42 U.S.C. S 1985(3) (1988).
99. See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
100. Amicus Brief in Support of Respondents by Organizations Committed to Women's
Health and Women's Equality, Bray, 113 S. Ct. 753 (No. 90-985) [hereinafter NARAL
briefl.
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instance in which an anti[-abortion protestor] recorded the
license plate number, got the name of the owner and called to
preach on the evils of abortion. Sadly, the person who owned
the car was the mother of a woman who had not confided her
pregnancy to her family.
Everything worked out fine but temporarily destroyed the
relationship between mother and daughter. The daughter had
been impregnated by the mother's boyfriend. While the patient
did not.consider her pregnancy a result of rape, she maintained
that the mother's boyfriend had taken advantage of her when
she arrived home in a drunken state. The incident was the
only sexual contact of any sort for the patient in months.10 1
[ ]writes down the license tag numbers from all the cars parked
in the clinic parking lot. Some of the clients who come from
small towns are intimated [sic] by this.02
The protestors stand on the stairs where there is little room
to pass. One of them usually has a camcorder and videotapes
patients. This is one of the most intrusive and upsetting things
I have seen so far. The patients are afraid that they will see
themselves on television, maybe the evening news!103
These tactics harm women's health while also exposing them to
domestic violence through breach of their confidentiality.
Applying the Ku Klux Klan Act against Operation Rescue, a
federal judge in New York found that Operation Rescue used
videocameras as an offensive weapon to intimidate women from
having abortions:
[Tihe evidence clearly shows that defendants use cameras as
offensive weapons to harass and intimidate patients entering
the clinics. Defendants have even pointed the cameras directly
into the faces of patients seeking access to the clinics. They
have also videotaped patient vehicles and their license plates
as they enter the medical facilities. Defendants are well aware
that women seeking abortions, especially younger women, are
often terrified at the prospect of anyone, especially family
members, finding out that they are having an abortion, and
that the presence of cameras increases patients' fear that their
identities might be revealed.04
101. Id. at app. B, letter C3.
102. Id. at app. B, letter C37.
103. Id. at app. B, letter C62.
104. Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1426 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
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Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court in Hirsh v. City of Atlanta0 5
found that Operation Rescue violated state law by its intimidating
use of videocameras:
A clinic executive director testified that the protestors' activ-
ities caused patients much anxiety, that those who did gain
access were visibly upset and some emotionally distraught.
Patients' blood pressure and pulse rates were elevated by the
impediments they had had to overcome to gain entry, subject-
ing the women to additional health risk should an abortion,
performed under local anesthesia, be done while the patient
was in such a shaken state.10
2. Harassment, Intimidation, and Violence
Although Operation Rescue may describe itself as "pro-life,"
its verbal and physical tactics are anything but peaceful.
a. Disrespect for Life
Excerpts from the letters from NARAL's brief describe the
"anti-life" hostility of the Operation Rescue demonstrators.
These fanatics reveal their true agenda. They demonstrated
their disregard of women's health and well being. This becomes
evident when they shout to a women [sic] in the driveway
"You should die, not your baby."117
From the very beginning of my escort work and continuing
to this day, I have been subjected to many types of harassment.
Verbal assault consists of being called "murderer, butcher,
garbage of society, vulture" etc. as well as comments about
my personal appearance (hairstyle, clothing) and my lifestyle
(the size of my home, the car I drive, etc.). There were nu-
merous verbal threats made about my daughter, who was 24
years old. Comments such as "we know where your daughter
is, we know where she lives." They also learned the identity
of her fiancee [sic] and in June, 1988 when she was planning
to be married, the demonstrators threatened to "publicly em-
barrass" [sic] me by appearing at her wedding, forcing me to
105. 401 S.E.2d 530 (Ga.). cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1221 (1991).
106. Id. at 532.
107. NARAL brief, supra note 100, at app. B, letter CS.
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have police officers at the church and at my home where the
reception was held.108
I was standing near the entrance of the clinic, helping people
coming into the clinic from the street. I was face to face with
the anti [abortion] protestors.... A man was standing by the
fence, with 2 young children. The girl was maybe 6 and the
boy no older than eight. They stood on either side of this man,
just watching everything. I assumed the man was their father.
I was wearing a hat for protection from the sun and had taken
it off to wipe my forehead. The man yelled out, to me and
especially his children, "See that red head? If you ever see
her on the street you can kill her, because she's no good and
she kills babies." I'll never forget those words. He said it with
such force, that for a moment I was scared. I had never been
threatned [sic] before and I was nervous. In that one moment
this man was teaching his children to hate and kill anyone who
differs from their opinion. As my knees shook, I stood there,
knowing there was nothing I could say. 109
b. Violence and Harassment
The NARAL letters also demonstrate the harassment, threats
of violence, and actual violence perpetrated by Operation Rescue:
Physical intimidation and verbal assault are the primary tools
employed against women by anti-abortion groups. They refrain
from accosting men on public streets to demand personal
information on pregnancy states [sic], marital status, religion,
or his sex life. Instead they assail women. A woman approach-
ing a clinic is first surrounded by anti-choice demonstrators
who shout at her to be heard over one another. If she tries to
get away from them or says that she is not interested they
persist in following, pressing themselves on her, and blocking
her every step in order to continue their rebuke and deluge
of contempt. Recently I witnessed a so called 'pro-lifer' hiss at
a woman who was trying to extricate herself from a group of
blockaders, "Murderer, Murderer,, Murderer. Kill, Kill, Kill."l1O
A man in his late 50's or early 60's, about 6'1" or 6'2",
wearing a clerical collar approached me and stood very, very
close to me. He was carrying some sort of rolled up cloth
108. Id. at app. B, letter C29.
109. Id. at app. B, letter C79.
110. Id. at app. B, letter C14.
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which I assumed was a sign and wooden stakes to drive the
sign into the ground ....
He continued to breathe heavily, as though he were barely
restraining himself from hitting me and to move very close to
me, within 9" of my body. He said, "You had better get out
of here, miss." ... He said again, "I'm warning you, miss. Leave
now." I did not. He then took one of the wooden stakes, which
seemed, from my peripheral vision, to be about a foot long
made from rough lumber with a point at the end and a metal
sheet in the middle, out of his bundle and into his free hand.
It was trembling. He brought it up to my left eye, a little to
the left of the center of my eye, and about 2 or 3 inches away
from my face. He began to twist the stake slowly from side
to side, not saying anything, but breathing heavily. Then he
said, "Get out of here!" and he jabbed the stake toward my
eye on each syllable.
I did not move, looking back on it, probably because I was
too frightened to move. Then a group of escorts came by me
and when he saw the orange T-shirts, he slipped back into the
crowd and I did not follow him ....
The incident also angered me greatly. It was the first time
in my life that I had been physically threatened. He was taking
advantage of the fact that he was a foot taller than I, at least
100 lbs. heavier, and, for all practical purposes, armed.11
The windows in the clinic have been shot out three different
times during the night and it is also frightening to arrive in
the morning to find windows shattered by bullets and bullets
lodged in the walls. 12
In another incident, a carload of "Operation Rescue" menibers
failed to respond to a police order to stop their car at the
mobilization site for a "rescue" attempt in December of 1989.
The "Operation Rescue" members actually drove their car into
the police officer who was dressed in plain clothes. He got on
the front hood of their car while they continued to drive on.
All the time he was yelling "Stop, I'm a police officer" and
flashing his badge. 13
Thursday evening I met my partner at the [ metro stop, and
we headed over to where Operation Rescue was lodged during
the D.C. Project II weekend. Our assignment was to photo-
graph people involved with Operation Rescue to update our
files. We were making our way through the parking lot when
111. Id. at app. B, letter C16.
112. Id. at app. B, letter C29.
113. Id. at app. B, letter C39.
1994]
122 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 1:93
we saw two men approaching us. I agreed with my partner
that I should photograph the one on the left, and she, the one
on the right. I took my subjects [sic] photo, while my partner
focused in on her's (sic]. As I lowered my camera, I saw my
partner's subject-a man that we have identified as "Ed", one
of Randall Terry's body guards-rush my partner, picking her
up, and slamming her against the brick wall of the hotel. She
got up off the ground, whereupon, "Ed" rushed her again,
forcing her to the ground, kicking her in the stomach, back,
face, and breasts. "Ed" then pulled out his metal flashlight and
began clubbing my partner on the head and neck with the
instrument. During this time, my partner had curled up in a
ball, attempting to protect her head and body. I was photo-
graphing the entire incident. All the while, "Ed" was screaming
at my partner that he was "going to kill her", calling her a
"murderous bitch", "cunt", "whore" and "slut". I attempted to
intercede, and "Ed" turned towards me with his raised flash-
light, until my partner's movements brought his attention back
to her, and he continued to beat her. I ran to get help, and
upon my return "Ed" had fled off into the parking lot some-
where.114
In issuing an injunction against Operation Rescue in Buffalo,
New York, United States District Judge Arcara made findings
supporting many of the examples cited above.115 During physical
blockading, he found that the demonstrators "trespass on the
clinic property and sit or lay in the entrances of the clinic in an
attempt to block access to and egress from the clinic." 116 Con-
structive blockading includes "demonstrating and picketing around
the entrances of the clinics, and ... harassing patients and staff
entering and leaving the clinics."" 7 The court also found that
Operation Rescue's actions include
frequently and routinely congregat[ing] in or near the driveway
entrances to the facility parking lots in order to impede and
obstruct access to the facilities ... yell1ing] at patients, patient
escorts and medical staff entering and leaving the health care
facilities ... [and] crowd[ing] around people trying to enter the
facilities in an intimidating and obstructing manner, and
114. Id. at app. B, letter C43.
115. Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
116. Id. at 1423.
117. Id. at 1424.
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grab[bing], push[ing] and shov[ing] the patients, patient escorts
and staff.18
c. Impact on Disadvantaged Women
As with the Casey decision, it was the most disadvantaged
women in society who were adversely affected by the Court's
decision in Bray-the women who face both public harassment
by Operation Rescue and domestic violence through their loss of
confidentiality. The NARAL letters document this impact on
young and poor women who are disproportionately racial minor-
ities.
In the summer of 1990, we received a call from the [ clinic
located in East L.A.; a primarily low-income Hispanic neigh-
borhood. These neighborhoods are favorite targets of Operation
Rescue due to the fact that their residents have few health-
care options available to them ....
One Saturday ... a woman in the company of her two
children approached the clinic [to take her children to a dentist
in the same building who donated his services to children on
Saturdays]. They were met by a frenzy of hostile picketers
who shoved at them photographs of what they claimed were
aborted fetuses and screamed at the mother, "Don't kill your
baby!"
... [O]nce inside, the children were hysterical, crying out,
"Mommy, don't kill us"
... The situation at the clinic continued on this way for
several months with little help from the local police. It finally
ended when the priest and his church group decided to move
on to another clinic. Currently, they are harassing women at
a health care facility located in [ another low-income Hispanic
area.
... Most importantly, consider the people who are made to
suffer the greatest; the poor and disadvantage [sic] of our
community who have so few options to choose from, and who
utilize women's health care facilities for the variety of services
they provide.119
I remember one young Hispanic couple in particular who came
in last December. The woman was carrying a fetus which,
118. Id.
119. NARAL brief, supra note 100, at app. B, letter C8.
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through amniocentesis, was determined to be without kidneys.
Their doctor told them that the fetus probably would not
survive delivery, but would definitely not be able to survive
on its own. Because protestors were sitting in front of our
doors, myself and another staff member pulled the couple over
the protestors and through the doors. You could see the shock
and dispair [sic], especially on the husband's face, who by now,
was in tears. They told me that they wanted to have children,
but under the circumstances, felt terminating the pregnancy
at that point was the best thing. The people blocking the doors
just made a very difficult experience even more traumatic.1 20
N [ ] concentrates on the youngest and most vulnerable looking
clients. She tells the young men, "If you love her, you'll get
her out of there. She could die. That clinic isn't safe. If she
dies, it will be your fault." 121
The instances of verbal abuse to patients are nearly endless.
One of the hardest things I have to do as a volunteer is to
keep the men who come in with patients from assaulting the
protestors. In one instance, a 17 year-old came in with his
girlfriend. The protestors started with the normal "Don't let
her kill her baby", "Be a man-that's your baby she's going
to kill", "God made her a mother for a reason" nonsense. The
patient burst into tears and the boy finally turned to the crowd
and screamed, "Let her alone. She was raped!" One protestor
shouted, "How do you know it's not your baby she's killing?"
The boy replied, "Because I love her too much to sleep with
her before we're married." 122
The husband of a young black woman was also shouting back
at the "protestors" telling them that they did not understand
the difficulty of raising, supporting, emotionally supporting and
giving enough love to the four children he and his wife already
had at home. He told the "protestors" how the government
was already having to help them financially and that this
decision, made by he and his wife, was their personal right
giving the "protestors" no right to interfer [sic].
... These women are trying the best way they know how
to make the most difficult decision of their lives at a time
when they are already emotionally stressed by their situation.
Before they enter our clinic, they have already had many family
discussions and disputes over the situation they are in. This
is especially true of parents with young girls who have been
120. Id. at app. B, letter C26.
121. Id. at app. B, letter C37.
122. Id. at app. B, letter C38.
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on'drugs and feel that it is better for a decision to be made
now. 12
A patient [ told us that she had six children at home and
wouldn't be able to get back to the clinic since she lived 2 1/
2 hours away and didn't have a car. She had been able to get
a ride this time but couldn't get one again. Abortion is no
longer available in her community because doctors who did
them were picketed and harassed until they stopped doing
them. 24
B. Importance of the Bray Decision
As the Ku Klux Klan Act has been interpreted to protect
African American travelers from the assault of a white mob, 125
it should protect women from the mob violence of anti-abortion
demonstrators. The tactics of Operation Rescue fit perfectly into
the conspiracy requirement of the Ku Klux Klan Act.126 As a
conspiracy, it has a media spokesperson and national mailings
announcing, for example, its "Summer of Purpose." Its leaders
decide exactly what abortion facilities to target; they do not
disclose their plans to anyone, including their followers. They
then arrange for their followers to board a bus that they drive
to an undisclosed location where demonstration activity occurs.
Their followers make no tactical decisions. All such decisions are
made by the leaders of the conspiracy. The statute's class-based
animus requirement is met, because Operation Rescue is engaged
in a systematic course of unlawful conduct aimed at preventing
women-and only women-from enjoying a legal right that can
be exercised by women-and only women.
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs could not establish the required
class-based animus in Bray. In Justice Scalia's words in the Bray
decision:
Respondents' case comes down, then, to the proposition that
intent is legally irrelevant; that since voluntary abortion is an
activity engaged in only by women, to disfavor it is ipso facto
to discriminate invidiously against women as a class. Our cases
do not support that proposition. In Geduldig v. Aiello we
123. Id. at app. B, letter C59.
124. Id. at app. B, letter C64.
125. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971).
126. 42 U.S.C. $ 1985(3) (1988).
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rejected the claim that a state disability insurance system that
denied coverage to certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy
discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .... The same
principle applies to the "class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus" requirement of S 1985(3).12
Applying that test to the Bray case, Justice Scalia readily con-
cluded that the plaintiffs could not meet the gender-based animus
requirement. In Scalia's words: "Whether one agrees or disagrees
with the goal of preventing abortion, that goal in itself (apart
from the use of unlawful means to achieve it, which is not relevant
to our discussion of animus) does not remotely qualify for such
harsh description, and for such derogatory association with ra-
cism." 128
Although the dissent disagreed with Scalia's analysis of the
gender-based requirement, the dissent did not understand the
particular impact that this statute would have on the most
disadvantaged women in society. For example, the dissent stated:
Petitioners, however, are not mere opponents of abortion;
they are defiant lawbreakers who have engaged in massive
concerted conduct that is designed to prevent all women from
making up their own minds about not only the issue of abortion
in general, but also whether they should (or will) exercise a
right that all women-and only women-possess.12
The conduct of Operation Rescue, however, is not designed to
prevent all women from making up their own minds. Instead,
Operation Rescue targets the most disadvantaged women in
society and tries to make abortion entirely unavailable to them.
Operation Rescue is not likely to change these women's minds
about abortion, but it is likely to make abortion physically una-
vailable to them. That fact is the essence of Operation Rescue's
illegal activity that is not described by the majority or the
dissent.
Congress recently passed a statute, the Freedom of Access to
Clinics Entrance Act of 1994130 (FACE), to protect women from
127. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 760-71 (1993) (citations
omitted).
128. Id. at 762.
129. Id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. 18 U.S.C. S 248 (1994).
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abortion clinic violence. FACE was passed, at least in part, as a
response to the death of Dr. Gunn, a Florida physician who
performed abortions and was killed by an abortion protestor
earlier in 1994.131 This statute is very important because it
represents the first time that Congress has corrected a Supreme
Court decision in the abortion area through legislation. The
effectiveness of this statute will partly depend on whether the
courts rule that it violates the First Amendment rights of abor-
tion protestors.132
The Supreme Court's recent decision that the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organization laws (RICO) can be applied to
organizations that are not seeking economic gain through their
activities has caused some people to believe that a new weapon
is now available to challenge anti-abortion violence at clinics. 1- I
am skeptical of this new hope because I believe it is equally
likely that this decision will be used against pro-choice demon-
strators. When I was working against Operation Rescue in 1992,
many of my clients received threatening letters from Operation
Rescue saying that the organization was planning to file RICO
charges against pro-choice demonstrators. At that time, I was
able to tell my clients not to take that harassment seriously
because the legal precedent did not support such an allegation.
But now, I cannot be so glib. In other words, RICQ may simply
be another harassing weapon available to anti-choice demonstra-
tors. Moreover, because Operation Rescue does an excellent job
of hiding its assets, it is unlikely that RICO could ever achieve
a destructive monetary effect against Operation Rescue. Thus, I
am skeptical that RICO will be an effective weapon for pro-choice
activists; it is more likely to be another irritant with which we
will have to contend.
Statutes such as FACE and RICO are not the only options
available to deter clinic violence. For example, the President has
the authority to send federal marshalls to assist local police if
Operation Rescue and their supporters overwhelm the resources
131. See 140 CONG. REC. S 5595, 5596 (1994) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum); see also
William Booth, Doctor KiUed During Abortion Protest, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1993, at Al
(reporting that Michael F. Griffin killed Dr. David Gunn by shooting him three times in
the -back outside of the Pensacola Women's Medical Services Clinic).
132. See American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 855 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1994) (upholding
the constitutionality of the Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act); see also Madsen
v. Women's Health Ctr. Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (considering whether restrictions on
abortion protestors violated the First Amendment).
133. NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, reh'g deiied, 114 S. Ct. 1340 (1994).
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of local police forces. Rather than go to federal court, in the
future women may go to the United States Attorney's office and
request federal assistance. Under either scenario-seeking fed-
eral court assistance or executive branch assistance-women are
dependent upon the changing politics of the judicial or executive
branches of government. No solution appears to be permanent
or longlasting. An amendment to the Ku Klux Klan Act to
specifically protect women from anti-abortion violence, or a sep-
arate statute to this effect, would have the most long-term,
beneficial results.
I did not appreciate the importance of the Ku Klux Klan Act
to women's lives until Operation Rescue arrived in Louisiana
during the summer of 1992. Through mass mailings, Operation
Rescue publicly stated that it would target the only abortion
clinic in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and suggested that it would
also come to New Orleans for protest activity at the dozen or so
clinics in the New Orleans area. Working with the National
Organization for Women (NOW) Legal Defense and Education
Fund as well as with a coalition of Louisiana lawyers, I tried to
obtain court injunctions to limit Operation Rescue's tactics in
both cities. Because we could not meet the jurisdictional require-
ments of the Ku Klux Klan Act in Baton Rouge, we proceeded
in state court under state trespass law.134 Despite the fact that
Operation Rescue was encamped around the Baton Rouge clinic,
we could not get an elected state court judge to enter an
injunction; in the judge's opinion, neither the clinic nor its pa-
tients were in imminent danger.
By contrast, in New Orleans, we were able to proceed in federal
court. 35 Despite the fact that Operation Rescue was over sixty
miles away in another city, we were able to obtain an injunction
within twenty-four hours of filing our pleadings. The result was
that the Baton Rouge clinic was practically a war zone with
Operation Rescue demonstrators blockading, harassing, pushing
and shoving patients, as well as surreptitiously taking some
patients to fake abortion clinics. The New Orleans clinics were
never targeted; the police told me that the injunction intimidated
Operation Rescue from entering the New Orleans area. Thus,
like African Americans after the Civil War, women unfortunately
cannot count on the protection of the state courts.
134. NOW v. Operation Rescue Nat'l, No. 382, 750 (19th Jud. Dist. La. July 8, 1992)
(Brown, J.).
135. NOW v. Operation Rescue Nat'l, No. CIV.A.92-2289, 1992 WL 165715 (E.D. La.
July 9, 1992).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Two hours after the oral argument in the Brnes"3 case, the
Fifth Circuit rendered its decision upholding the Mississippi
statute, finding it indistinguishable from the Pennsylvania statute
upheld in Casey l3 and denying plaintiffs' request for a factual
hearing in the district court to set forth the impact of the waiting
period requirement on women's lives. It is hard to know what to
hope for next. I could hope that women face horrible acts of
violence because of the loss of their confidentiality so that we
could present those facts to the court in an "as applied" challenge.
But, of course, that would mean that women's lives would be
sacrificed to achieve a challenge to an abortion statute-not
something that I could ever desire. Or I could hope that we do
not hear of any such violence so we will not have any stories to
report to the court. But, unfortunately, the fact that we do not
hear of such stories does not mean that they do not exist. Women
who have faced violence in their lives have always been invisible;
their continued invisibility would be no victory.
The problem of violence against women is not likely to disap-
pear tomorrow. But maybe we can, at least, start to break down
the myth about women who choose abortions and the women
who experience violence. All women in society are at risk of
experiencing violence in their lives. Neither wealth, age, marital
status, nor pregnancy immunizes women from violence. Although
all women who experience or are at risk of experiencing violence
may need judicial protection, that protection is not equally avail-
able to all women. Instead, poor, young women who are dispro-
portionately African American receive the least judicial protection
from violence. Moreover, despite attempts by the so-called "pro-
life" movement to create distorted images of women in society,
pregnant women who seek abortions are not murderers. Instead,
they are often victims both of private and public violence. We
need to start to value their lives, young or old, rich or poor,
white or black.'
136. Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992).
137. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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